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Clear Inarticulation—State Action Antitrust 
Immunity and State Agencies:  
Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England Newborn 
Screening Program 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Parker v. Brown,1 the Supreme Court held that states are im-
mune from federal antitrust law for their actions as sovereigns. This 
has come to be known as the Parker Doctrine or the state action 
doctrine. In Parker, a raisin distributor, Porter Brown, challenged a 
1940 California regulation that raised prices and restricted the supply 
of California raisins. The Court found that the Sherman Act con-
tained neither a hint nor a suggestion of any intention “to restrain 
state action or official action directed by a state.”2 Therefore, Cali-
fornia’s regulation of the raisin industry was immune from federal 
antitrust scrutiny. Because of this desire to defer to state sovereignty, 
states were found to be immune from federal antitrust actions. 
Predictably, applying the state action doctrine can be confusing. 
As one court noted, “[O]f late, the state action doctrine has become 
a road well-traveled by the Court. Its signposts, however, remain less 
than clear.”3 Unfortunately, the well-traveled road of the state action 
doctrine splits off into meandering paths that are not so well-
traveled. The path of state action antitrust immunity for actions 
taken by state agencies is one of the more difficult paths to follow, 
and the signposts that do exist are often confusing. As state reliance 
on state agency decision making becomes more prevalent, establish-
ing clear guidelines for applying state action immunity to state agen-
cies becomes increasingly important. 
The rules and requirements governing state action immunity are 
different according to the category in which an actor is placed. The 
Supreme Court has established three categories that are used to de-
 
 1. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
 2. Id. at 351. 
 3. First Am. Title Co. v. South Dakota Land Title Ass’n, 714 F.2d 1439, 1450 (8th 
Cir. 1983). 
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termine how state action immunity should be applied. The first cate-
gory includes acts of the state acting as sovereign. The actions of the 
state legislature and state supreme court fit into this category4 and 
are considered ipso facto immune from antitrust laws.5 The second 
category includes acts taken by political subdivisions. The acts of 
municipalities have been placed in this category.6 Their actions are 
immune from antitrust liability only where a clearly articulated state 
policy authorizes their actions.7 The final category includes acts taken 
by private actors pursuant to state regulations.8 Private actors are 
immune under the state action doctrine only when they act pursuant 
to a clearly articulated state policy and the state actively supervises 
the anticompetitive conduct.9 
The Supreme Court has not clearly explained how to categorize 
actions taken by a state agency. Consequently, lower courts—
particularly the United States Courts of Appeals—have attempted to 
decide the issue without guidance and, not surprisingly, have arrived 
at different conclusions. In Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England 
Newborn Screening Program,10 the First Circuit held that the actions 
of state executive agencies should be viewed as the actions of the 
state acting as a sovereign, thereby treating state agencies like state 
legislatures and state supreme courts and rendering state agencies 
immune from antitrust liability.11 In contrast, the Sixth and Second 
Circuits have applied the clear articulation requirement to state 
agency action, determining that the actions of state agencies should 
be placed in the same category as actions taken by municipalities or 
political subdivisions.12 
This Note will argue that the First Circuit correctly determined 
state agencies’ actions to be the actions of the state acting as a sover-
 
 4. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567 (1984); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 
433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977). 
 5. See Hoover, 466 U.S. at 567–68. 
 6. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413 (1978). 
 7. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 44 (1985). 
 8. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 
57 (1985). 
 9. See id.; California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 
97, 104 (1980). 
 10. 187 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 11. See id. at 28–29. 
 12. See Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 742 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1984); Auto-
mated Salvage Transp., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Envtl. Sys., Inc., 155 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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eign and that the actions of state agencies should not be subject to 
the clear articulation requirement. The clear articulation requirement 
should not be used because it burdens state agencies by making 
regulation more difficult, costly, and time consuming. Under the 
clear articulation requirement, when deciding whether antitrust im-
munity can be granted to state agencies, courts must search for a 
statutory provision plainly showing that “the legislature contem-
plated the kind of action complained of.”13 Resolving the question of 
how to categorize state agencies is important because state agencies 
and private actors acting pursuant to state regulations need to be 
able to determine beforehand whether their actions are likely to be 
granted immunity and what burdens they will be subjected to before 
immunity can be granted. 
Part II of this Note outlines the background and development of 
the law regarding state action antitrust immunity. In addition, Part 
II summarizes the debate between the circuits about whether a clear 
articulation of a legislative intent for an agency to restrain competi-
tion is required before state action immunity can be applied to the 
state agency. Part III gives the facts of Neo Gen and discusses the 
analysis used by the First Circuit in holding that the actions of state 
executive agencies should receive immunity from antitrust suits. 
Next, Part IV appraises the value of the First Circuit’s reasoning in 
Neo Gen in light of other attempts to reconcile where state agencies 
belong in the antitrust state action doctrine. Part IV suggests that 
the logic and analysis employed by the First Circuit are appropriate 
for determining when the actions of state agencies are entitled to 
immunity from antitrust actions. Part V concludes that the actions of 
state agencies should be deemed actions of the state itself and should 
not be subject to the same clear articulation requirement that applies 
to municipalities. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. State Action Antitrust Immunity: History, Purpose, and Function 
The Supreme Court has developed three categories within the 
Parker Doctrine to determine whether the state is acting as sovereign 
 
 13. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978) 
(quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 
1976)). 
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and what type of extra safeguards need to be added when the actor is 
not the state itself. Therefore, the first step in state action immunity 
analysis is to determine within which category the actor should be 
placed. 
1.  State legislatures and state supreme courts 
The first category of actors includes state legislatures and state 
supreme courts. The Supreme Court ruled in Hoover v. Ronwin14 
that actors in this category “ipso facto are exempt from the operation 
of the antitrust laws.”15 The Court further explained that state legis-
latures are entitled to this immunity because of the language in 
Parker: 
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its his-
tory which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its of-
ficers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a dual 
system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states 
are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract 
from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s 
control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to 
Congress.16 
State supreme courts were extended the same immunity as state 
legislatures in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.17 In reviewing this issue, 
the Hoover Court explained the Bates ruling by stating that “a state 
supreme court, when acting in a legislative capacity, occupies the 
same position as that of a state legislature. Therefore, a decision of a 
state supreme court, acting legislatively rather than judicially, is ex-
empt from Sherman Act liability as state action.”18 
The Bates case focused on the authority of the state supreme 
court to regulate the practice of law. The Supreme Court explained 
in Bates that the key question was whether the anticompetitive re-
straint was compelled by the State acting as sovereign.19 Because the 
state supreme court was the ultimate body wielding the State’s 
power over the practice of law, the state supreme court was acting in 
 
 14. 466 U.S. 558 (1984). 
 15. Id. at 567–68. 
 16. Id. at 567 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943)). 
 17. 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977). 
 18. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 568 (citing Bates, 433 U.S. at 360). 
 19. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 360. 
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a legislative capacity, representing the State acting as sovereign, when 
it regulated the practice of law.20 Based on the reasoning in Hoover 
and Bates, the actions of state legislatures and supreme courts (when 
acting legislatively) are immune from antitrust liability because the 
Sherman Act does not apply to the actions of a state acting as sover-
eign. 
2. Municipalities and political subdivisions 
In the second category, political subdivisions, such as municipali-
ties, are immune from antitrust liability only where their anticom-
petitive acts flow from a “clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed state policy.”21 Closer analysis of municipality action is 
required than for state legislature or supreme court action because 
political subdivisions are not themselves sovereign.22 Because Parker’s 
exemption limitations were aimed at official action directed by a 
state, the Court required state subdivisions to be able to trace their 
actions back to the state itself in order to prove they were compelled 
by the state acting as sovereign.23 The Supreme Court was unwilling 
to presume that Congress intended to exclude anticompetitive mu-
nicipal action from federal antitrust laws.24 The Court thus refused to 
extend ipso facto immunity to municipalities because of a fear that 
economic dislocation could result if cities were free to place their 
own interests above the nation’s economic goals as reflected in the 
antitrust laws.25 
3. Private actors 
The third category encompasses private actors. Private actors can 
benefit from state action antitrust immunity only if they act pursuant 
to a clearly articulated state policy and if the state actively supervises 
the anticompetitive conduct.26 The Supreme Court extended immu-
 
 20. See id. 
 21. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 44 (1985). 
 22. See id. at 38 (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 
389, 412 (1978)). 
 23. See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412–13. 
 24. See id. at 413. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 
57 (1985); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 104 
(1980). 
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nity for private action because otherwise the congressional purpose 
outlined in Parker would be frustrated, “for a State would be unable 
to implement programs that restrain competition among private par-
ties.”27 The Court added the active supervision requirement to pre-
vent “the State from frustrating the national policy in favor of com-
petition by casting a ‘gauzy cloak of state involvement’ over what is 
essentially private anticompetitive conduct.”28 The active supervision 
requirement “ensures that a State’s actions will immunize the anti-
competitive conduct of private parties only when the ‘state has dem-
onstrated its commitment to a program through its exercise of regu-
latory oversight.’”29 
B. Antitrust Immunity for State Agencies: Development of the Law 
The Supreme Court has never determined whether state agencies 
should be placed in the same antitrust category as state legislatures 
and supreme courts or in the municipality category. Circuit courts 
proceeded to address the issue without Supreme Court guidance, 
leading to a split among the circuits regarding how to treat state 
agency actions. Some circuits have declined to apply the clear articu-
lation test, finding that the actions of the state agency should be 
placed within the same category as actions taken by the state legisla-
ture or state supreme court. Other circuits have placed state agencies 
within the political subdivision category, requiring the clear articula-
tion test to be performed before state action immunity can be 
granted. 
1. Circuits holding the clear articulation requirement inapplicable to 
state agencies 
Three circuits have held that the clear articulation test should not 
apply to state agencies in determining antitrust liability. The First 
Circuit, for example, has held that the clear articulation test should 
not be applied to actions taken by state agencies. In Neo Gen, the 
court stated, “[W]e have rejected a ‘clear articulation’ test as applied 
to the state’s executive branch, at least where a full-fledged depart-
 
 27. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 56. 
 28. Id. at 57 (citing Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106). 
 29. Id. at 62 n.23 (citing 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶ 213a (1978)). 
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ment is concerned.”30 The court reasoned that, according to the 
Parker Doctrine, Congress did not seek to regulate the states them-
selves and “‘the states’ include their executive branches quite as 
much as their legislatures and their courts.”31 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held in Charley’s Taxi Radio Dis-
patch Corp. v. SIDA of Hawaii, Inc.32 that “state executives and ex-
ecutive agencies, like the state supreme court, are entitled to Parker 
immunity for actions taken pursuant to their constitutional authority, 
regardless of whether these particular actions or their anticompetitive 
effects were contemplated by the legislature.”33 The Ninth Circuit 
justified its decision to withhold the clear articulation requirement 
from state agencies, thereby placing the agencies in a different cate-
gory than municipalities, by explaining that “cities are treated differ-
ently from branches of the state governments for purposes of the 
Eleventh Amendment.”34 
The Ninth Circuit also noted in Deak-Perera Hawaii, Inc. v. De-
partment of Transportation35 that Hoover v. Ronwin36 had left open 
“the circumstances under which the activities of a state executive 
branch are entitled to antitrust immunity.”37 The Ninth Circuit held 
that the Department of Transportation was entitled to immunity be-
cause it was fulfilling its state constitutional duty by acting as the 
governor’s subordinate and this action constituted the state acting as 
sovereign.38 The court explained that the clear articulation require-
ment did not apply because of the difference between this case and 
the situation in Lafayette. The court indicated that Lafayette “in-
volved a government delegation of authority to private parties” but 
“this is not a case of private parties imposing competitive restraints in 
conjunction with state authorities.”39 
 
 
 30. Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England Newborn Screening Program, 187 F.3d 
24, 29 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 31. Id. 
 32. 810 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 33. Id. at 876. 
 34. Id. at 876 n.6. 
 35. 745 F.2d 1281 (1984). 
 36. 466 U.S. 558 (1984). 
 37. Deak-Perera, 745 F.2d at 1282 (citing Hoover, 466 U.S. at 568). 
 38. See id. 
 39. Id. at 1283. 
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The Fifth Circuit also refused to apply the clear articulation test 
when it held that a state agency was not liable for alleged antitrust 
violations. In Saenz v. University Interscholastic League,40 the plaintiff 
argued that the University Interscholastic League (“UIL”) violated 
antitrust law by rejecting his slide rule product for use in an inter-
scholastic competition.41 The UIL escaped liability because the court 
held that the agency was “a governmental entity outside the ambit of 
the Sherman Act,”42 thus placing the agency in the same category as 
state legislatures and supreme courts. 
These three circuits have refused to apply the clear articulation 
requirement to state agencies, although not for particularly clear rea-
sons. The First and Ninth Circuits each stated that executive agen-
cies deserved ipso facto immunity because they were part of the ex-
ecutive branch. The Fifth Circuit, however, simply stated that state 
agencies are outside of the clear articulation requirement without 
making any distinction regarding executive agencies. 
None of the circuits appears to have addressed whether different 
types of state agencies should be treated differently based on whether 
they are defined as an executive agency. Although state agencies may 
be classified as executive, legislative, or perhaps independent, it is not 
clear whether the circuit court had these distinctions in mind and 
meant to exclude any type of state agency from ipso facto immunity. 
It is not clear what might distinguish state agencies from one an-
other for antitrust purposes. At the federal level, executive agencies 
are generally defined as “[a]gencies whose heads are subject to 
unlimited presidential removal authority.”43 Independent agencies 
are those “headed by persons who the President cannot remove at 
will.”44 It is unclear whether the First and Ninth Circuits intended to 
only grant ipso facto immunity to agencies that are a part of the ex-
ecutive department but not those that are independent or attached 
to the state legislature. It is possible that these courts defined execu-
tive agencies as agencies that exercise executive power. Under this 
type of definition, most agencies would qualify for immunity because 
agencies “typically wield powers that are characteristic of each of the 
 
 40. 487 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 41. See id. at 1027. 
 42. See id. at 1028. 
 43. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7 (1998). 
 44. Id. at 8. 
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three principle branches of government,” including “executive power 
to investigate potential violations of rules or statutes and to prose-
cute offenders.”45 
Because it is unclear what type of executive ties the First and 
Ninth Circuits had in mind when granting immunity to “executive 
agencies,” ipso facto immunity should not be denied to agencies that 
do not fit the federal definition of an executive agency based solely 
on the circuit courts’ choice of words. Based on the arguments given 
in Part IV, state agencies should be placed within the same category 
as state supreme courts and legislatures for antitrust immunity pur-
poses. 
2. Circuits holding the clear articulation requirement applicable to 
state agencies 
So far, two circuits have adopted the rule making the clear articu-
lation requirement applicable to state agency action. The Second 
Circuit held in Cine 42nd Street Theater Corp. v. Nederlander Org., 
Inc.46 that “[w]hen a state agency, municipality, or other state subdi-
vision claims a state immunity from federal law, it must first identify 
a ‘clearly expressed state policy’ that authorizes its actions.”47 How-
ever, the Second Circuit later appeared to backtrack from this posi-
tion in Automated Salvage Transport, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Environ-
mental Systems, Inc.,48 where the court found that certain types of 
state agencies should be treated “as the State itself rather than as a 
municipality.”49 The court left the question of how to treat state 
agency action open, however, because it decided the case on other 
grounds and ruled that the clear articulation requirement had been 
met.50 Because Cine 42nd Street Theater has not been overruled, it 
appears that the Second Circuit requires the application of the clear 
articulation test to state agency action. However, the dicta in Auto-
mated Salvage Transport raises the possibility that the requirement 
may be overruled in the future and state agencies may be treated the 
same as the state legislature or supreme court. 
 
 45. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN 
A NUTSHELL 9 (4th ed. 1997). 
 46. 790 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 47. Id. at 1043 (citing Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 40 (1985)). 
 48. 155 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 49. Id. at 70. 
 50. See id. at 71–72. 
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The Sixth Circuit expressed confusion about whether to apply 
the clear articulation requirement to the actions of the Ohio Water 
Development Agency (“OWDA”) in Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City 
of Akron.51 The court noted that there was a good argument that an 
agency with statewide powers “should not be required to show that 
its conduct was ‘pursuant to an affirmatively expressed and clearly ar-
ticulated policy’ to displace competition.”52 The court ended up ap-
plying the clear articulation requirement because the parties never 
argued whether or not OWDA should have been viewed as the state 
acting as sovereign.53 
III. NEO GEN SCREENING, INC. V. NEW ENGLAND NEWBORN 
SCREENING PROGRAM 
A. The Facts 
Neo Gen Screening, Inc. (“Neo Gen”), a private Pennsylvania 
corporation, brought a federal antitrust action against the University 
of Massachusetts, the University’s Screening Program (the New 
England Newborn Screening Program), and officials of the Massa-
chusetts Department of Public Health. Neo Gen charged the Screen-
ing Program and University, in concert with the Department of Pub-
lic Health, with “monopolizing, attempting to monopolize and/or 
conspiring to monopolize ‘newborn screening services’ in Massachu-
setts.”54 
The Screening Program, which consisted of a collection of per-
sonnel and a laboratory supervised by the medical school of the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts,55 operated under a contract between the 
University and the Department of Public Health to provide screen-
ing of newborn infants for specified disorders.56 In 1997, Neo Gen 
began trying to persuade hospitals in Massachusetts to use Neo Gen 
for screening newborns, claiming that it offered better screening at 
 
 51. 742 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 52. Id. at 957. 
 53. See id. 
 54. Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England Newborn Screening Program, 187 F.3d 
24, 25–26 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 55. See id. at 26. 
 56. See id. at 25. 
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half the cost charged by the Screening Program.57 According to the 
complaint, the University of Massachusetts and its Screening Pro-
gram then influenced the Department of Public Health to create 
emergency regulations requiring screening services in Massachusetts 
to be done exclusively by the Screening Program.58 
The district court dismissed the action on the ground that it was 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment because the University of Mas-
sachusetts and the Screening Program were arms of the state.59 Be-
cause Neo Gen failed to effectively dispute the district court’s hold-
ing that the Eleventh Amendment covered the University and its 
Screening Program, the First Circuit held the dismissal against those 
defendants was conceded by Neo Gen.60 
Neo Gen argued on appeal that the state officials in the Depart-
ment of Public Health were intended defendants and that injunctive 
relief was sought against them.61 Neo Gen further argued that the 
Eleventh Amendment did not bar injunctive relief against the state 
officials in the Department of Public Health if they violated the 
Sherman Act.62 The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the dis-
trict court, finding that even if the complaint was liberally construed 
to include the state officials, Neo Gen was not entitled to relief be-
cause the action of the Department of Public Health fell within ac-
tions protected by the state action antitrust immunity doctrine.63 
B. The Court’s Reasoning 
In finding that the actions of the state officials were entitled to 
protection under the state action immunity doctrine, the First Cir-
cuit examined the motivations behind the Parker Doctrine.64 The 
First Circuit then looked at cases that outlined the different catego-
ries within the Parker Doctrine.65 After examining how other circuits 
 
 57. See id. at 26. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. Because of an apparent pleading error, the district court found that no relief 
was being sought against the state officers. See id. at 27. 
 60. See id. at 26–27. 
 61. See id. at 27. 
 62. See id. at 27–28. 
 63. See id. at 29–30. 
 64. See id. at 28. 
 65. See id. The cases the court looked at in deciding which category they were dealing 
with included: City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); Hoo-
8KEP-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:42 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
1662 
had addressed the issue of how to categorize state agencies for state 
action purposes, the First Circuit determined that executive branch 
state agencies fit into the same category as state legislatures and 
courts.66 Therefore, no clear articulation analysis was required. 
1. Parker Doctrine purposes 
In analyzing the motivations behind the Parker Doctrine, the 
court explained that it was well settled that “a state is free to regu-
late, or act on its own behalf, in ways that are anti-competitive and 
would not be permitted to a private individual.”67 The court ac-
knowledged that the arrangement with the University and the De-
partment of Health was an effective monopoly of screening services 
but held that “a regulation or purchase of services made by the state 
is classic state action immunized from the Sherman Act.”68 Because 
the action taken by the state officials fit within the purposes of the 
Parker Doctrine, the court then examined whether such action was 
actually taken by the state or some lesser subdivision of the state that 
required further analysis before Parker Doctrine immunity could be 
applied.69 
2. Subcategories within the Parker Doctrine 
Neo Gen argued that the actions of the Department of Public 
Health should be subject to the clear articulation requirement as 
outlined in two Supreme Court cases,70 City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
Power & Light Co.71 and City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertis-
ing, Inc.72 In Lafayette, cities that owned and operated electric utility 
systems brought an antitrust action against a competing privately-
owned utility, Louisiana Power & Light, which then brought an an-
titrust counterclaim against the cities. The Supreme Court affirmed 
the Fifth Circuit’s holding that the counterclaim should not have 
 
ver v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 
U.S. 389 (1978). 
 66. See Neo Gen, 187 F.3d at 29. 
 67. Id. at 28 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943); 1 PHILLIP 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 221–22 (1997)). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. at 28–29. 
 70. See id. 
 71. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). 
 72. 499 U.S. 365 (1991). 
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been dismissed because a municipality is not ipso facto immune from 
anticompetitive action but must be able to show that “the state legis-
lature contemplated a certain type of anticompetitive restraint.”73 
The Court explained that the clear articulation requirement did not 
make it “necessary to point to an express statutory mandate for each 
act which is alleged to violate the antitrust laws. It will suffice if the 
challenged activity was clearly within the legislative intent.”74 The 
clear articulation requirement created by Lafayette established that 
where a subordinate state governmental body was involved a court 
must examine the specific facts of the case to determine whether 
anticompetitive actions were comprehended within the powers 
granted to it by the state legislature.75 
Neo Gen also relied on Omni to support its argument that the 
clear articulation requirement should be applied to the Department 
of Public Health’s actions.76 In this case, Omni brought an antitrust 
action against the city for adopting ordinances restricting new bill-
board construction that left Omni’s competitor, Columbia Outdoor 
Advertising, in control of more than ninety-five percent of the bill-
board market.77 The Court held that the clear articulation require-
ment applied to the city’s actions and found that the requirement 
was met. The Court explained that a statute met the clear articula-
tion requirement as long as the “suppression of competition [was] 
the ‘foreseeable result’ of what the statute authorizes.”78 
The First Circuit rejected Neo Gen’s use of the Lafayette and 
Omni cases to argue that the clear articulation requirement should 
apply to the actions of the Department of Public Health, explaining 
that the clear articulation requirement in Lafayette and Omni was 
applied only to municipalities, not to the state itself.79 The court 
then held that the actions of an executive branch agency should be 
viewed as the actions of the state, fitting within the same category as 
actions taken by the state legislature or state supreme court.80 
 
 73. 435 U.S. at 393. 
 74. Id. at 393–94 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 
431, 434–35 (5th Cir. 1976)). 
 75. See id. at 394. 
 76. See Neo Gen, 187 F.3d at 28. 
 77. See 499 U.S. at 365. 
 78. Id. at 373 (citing Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985)). 
 79. See Neo Gen, 187 F.3d at 28 (citing Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984)). 
 80. See id. at 28–29. 
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The court justified its holding by explaining that the Supreme 
Court “has held that acts of the state legislature or state supreme 
court are protected under Parker, but it reserved decision as to 
whether state-level executive branch departments or agencies are en-
titled to similar treatment.”81 Looking at how other circuits had 
dealt with the issue of which category to fit state agencies into, the 
court determined that only two other circuits had “squarely faced 
the issue.”82 The court explained that those two circuits, the Ninth 
Circuit in Charley’s Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Hawaii, 
Inc.83 and the Fifth Circuit in Saenz v. University Interscholastic 
League,84 “extended Parker’s ordinary protection to actions of the 
state executive branch.”85 
Based on the holdings of these courts and its own analysis, the 
First Circuit determined that the clear articulation requirement 
should not be applied to the actions of the Department of Health. 
The Department of Health’s contract with the University’s Screen-
ing Program was entitled to immunity from the antitrust allegations 
just as a state legislature or supreme court would be. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The controversy about whether state agencies should be granted 
the same level of antitrust immunity given to state legislatures and 
state supreme courts stems from two competing views of agencies. 
On the one side, agencies are viewed as legitimate policy makers be-
cause they are made up of independent experts who are best able to 
understand complex fact patterns and make the best regulatory deci-
sions for a specialized area.86 On the other side, agencies are seen as 
illegitimate speakers for the state because they are not politically re-
 
 81. Id. at 28 (citing Hoover, 466 U.S. at 568 n.17). The cited footnote reads: “This 
case does not present the issue whether the Governor of a State stands in the same position as 
the state legislature and supreme court for purposes of the state-action doctrine.” Hoover, 466 
U.S. at 568 n.17. 
 82. Id. at 28. 
 83. 810 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 84. 487 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 85. Neo Gen, 187 F.3d at 28–29 (citing Charley’s Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA 
of Haw., Inc., 810 F.2d 869, 875–76 (9th Cir. 1987); Deak-Perera Haw., Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Transp., 745 F.2d 1281, 1282–83 (9th Cir. 1984); Saenz v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 487 
F.2d 1026, 1027–28 (5th Cir. 1973)). 
 86. See Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 
YALE L.J. 1395, 1397 (1975). 
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sponsive like a legislature and are susceptible to the corrupting influ-
ence of regulated industries.87 Those who fear industry capture worry 
that state agencies are too susceptible to losing control of the regula-
tion process to the industries they supposedly regulate.88 
Although the Supreme Court has not discussed why agencies 
should or should not be held to the clear articulation requirement, 
examining those points actually addressed by the Court and the dif-
ferent arguments given by commentators for and against applying 
the clear articulation requirement helps to establish why the clear ar-
ticulation requirement should not be applied to state agency action. 
A. The Supreme Court Has Not Required Application of the Clear 
Articulation Test to State Agencies 
An antitrust case dealing specifically with the actions of a state 
agency has not yet come before the Supreme Court. The Court’s 
discussion in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.89 is the 
closest the Court has come to deciding the state agency issue. Exam-
ining the Court’s reasoning and language in Lafayette, along with 
other courts’ efforts to interpret this case, demonstrates that the clear 
articulation requirement should not be imposed on state agencies. 
1.  Lafayette does not require that the clear articulation requirement 
be applied to state agencies 
In Lafayette, the Court established the clear articulation rule, ex-
plaining that “cities and other subordinate governmental units” are 
only immune from antitrust liability where “the legislature contem-
plated the kind of action complained of.”90 The Court required 
closer analysis of political subdivision actions than state legislatures 
or state supreme courts because political subdivisions were not seen 
as sovereign actors. An example of how political subdivisions are not 
considered sovereign actors is the fact that the Eleventh Amendment 
does not provide political subdivisions with immunity from suit in 
federal court.91 The Court placed the burden of identifying a clear 
 
 87. See id. at 1397–99. 
 88. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 89. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). 
 90. Id. at 415 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 
431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976)). 
 91. See id. at 412. 
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articulation in qualifying for antitrust immunity on municipal actors 
“[i]n light of the serious economic dislocation which could result if 
cities were free to place their own parochial interests above the Na-
tion’s economic goals reflected in the antitrust laws.”92 
Confusion exists about how this holding applies to state agencies 
because the Court was examining a municipality’s actions rather than 
those of a state agency. Moreover, it remains unclear whether the 
Court meant to include state agencies in the “subordinate govern-
mental unit” category. 
The Sixth Circuit noted that the difficulty in interpreting the La-
fayette decision and how it relates to state agencies stems from the 
fact that the plurality and dissenting opinions in Lafayette are both 
supported by four justices.93 In Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of 
Akron,94 the Sixth Circuit attempted to interpret Lafayette’s applica-
tion to state agencies. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the plurality’s 
fear of economic dislocation within a state motivated the clear articu-
lation requirement and suggested that a different standard might ap-
ply to agencies with state-wide jurisdiction.95 The Hybud court rea-
soned that this economic dislocation theory might have meant that 
an agency with state-wide powers “should not be required to show 
that its conduct was ‘pursuant to an affirmatively expressed and 
clearly articulated policy’ to displace competition.”96 In the end, the 
Sixth Circuit avoided the issue and applied the clear articulation re-
quirement to actions taken by the Ohio Water Development Agency 
 
 92. Id. at 412–13. 
 93. See Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 742 F.2d 949, 955 n.5 (6th Cir. 1984) 
(quoting Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187, 1195 (6th Cir. 1981)). 
 94. 742 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 95. See id. at 956. 
 96. Id. at 957. The court used the following logic from Phillip Areeda to justify its posi-
tion: 
Although the Lafayette requirement of state authorization clearly applies to cities 
and other subordinate local units, its application to state agencies is uncertain. On 
the one hand, the majority’s belief that ‘authorization’ helps ensure that govern-
mental activity is truly state action could logically be extended to state executive de-
partments and administrative agencies. On the other hand, Justice Brennan’s reason-
ing was predicated on the existence of a large number of municipalities and other 
subordinate governmental units, each pursuing parochial and perhaps conflicting 
policies. Their ordinances are locally formulated, with a possible anticompetitive im-
pact beyond city or district limits. . . . State agencies, by contrast, formulate state-
wide rules and policies. 
Id. at 956–57 n.8 (quoting Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for “State Action” After Lafay-
ette, 95 HARV. L. REV. 435, 444 (1981)). 
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because the parties never argued that the agency’s actions could be 
directly attributed to the state acting as sovereign.97 
Regardless of any difficulties courts have experienced in 
interpreting Lafayette, the Lafayette Court explicitly noted that the 
clear articulation requirement has been applied to one type of state 
agency. The Court explained in Lafayette that Goldfarb v. Virginia 
State Bar98 “made it clear that, for purposes of the Parker doctrine, 
not every act of a state agency is that of the State as sovereign.”99 In 
Goldfarb, the state bar, “though acting within its broad powers, had 
‘voluntarily joined in what [was] essentially a private anticompetitive 
activity’ and was not executing the mandate of the State.”100 
The problem with this “clear” holding on state agencies is that 
state bars are rather unique state agencies, and it is difficult to apply 
this holding to actions of other state agencies. Both state legislation 
creating state bar associations and case law involving bar associations 
generally identify the state bar as a “state administrative agency.”101 
However, the bar is also identified as an arm of the state supreme 
court, and its power is strictly limited to actions given actual approval 
by the state supreme court.102 Because state supreme courts retain 
inherent power over the regulation of the legal practice, the clear ar-
ticulation requirement is already established for state bars in a way 
not required for other state agencies. If a state bar were to take any 
action not clearly approved by the state supreme court, it would 
definitely not be entitled to antitrust immunity because the statute or 
rule creating the state bar generally requires state supreme court ap-
proval. 
In contrast, state agencies do not require the explicit approval of 
the governmental branch above them in order to act. They possess 
much greater independent decisionmaking power than state bar as-
sociations. Because of the differences between state bar associations 
 
 97. See Hybud, 742 F.2d. at 957. 
 98. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
 99. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978). 
 100. Id. (quoting Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 792). 
 101. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 725 (West Supp. 2000); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 
81.011(a) (West 1998); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 767 P.2d 1020, 1025 (1989), rev’d, 496 
U.S. 1 (1990). 
 102. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6064, 6077, 6078, 6100 (West 1990); TEX. 
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.011(c) (West 1998); Brotsky v. State Bar of Cal., 368 P.2d 697 (Cal. 
1962); Saleeby v. State Bar of Cal., 702 P.2d 525, 557 (Cal. 1985); FLORIDA BAR RULE 1-
4.2(a) (West 1994). 
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and other state agencies, the Supreme Court’s statements about state 
bars as administrative agencies should not be applied to all state 
agencies. 
2.  Court interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment support placing 
state agencies within a different category than municipalities 
Because state agencies are treated differently than municipalities 
for Eleventh Amendment purposes, they should also be treated dif-
ferently for antitrust liability purposes. One of the reasons the Lafay-
ette Court gives for holding cities to a different standard than state 
legislatures is that cities are not themselves sovereign and do not re-
ceive the same federal deference.103 For example, the Eleventh 
Amendment precludes a suit against a state in federal court but fails 
to provide that same immunity to cities.104 While this reasoning justi-
fies holding cities to a different standard than states, it does not sup-
port imposing the clear articulation requirement on state agencies. 
Unlike cities, state agencies can receive Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity from suits in federal court where the agency is deemed to be an 
arm of the state.105 
The Second Circuit used the Eleventh Amendment to propose 
that the clear articulation standard should not apply to state agencies 
in Automated Salvage Transport, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Environmental 
Systems, Inc.106 The court explained that if the state agency’s lines of 
oversight were clear and substantial enough for the entity to be 
deemed an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes then 
the agency’s actions should also be viewed as that of the state itself 
rather than a political subdivision such as a municipality for antitrust 
purposes.107 The court noted that there were compelling reasons for 
concluding that the state agency “should be treated as the State itself 
rather than as a municipality.”108 However, the court ended up ap-
plying the clear articulation requirement to the agency’s actions 
anyway because it found that the requirement had been met.109 
 
 103. See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412. 
 104. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. City of Seattle, 271 U.S. 426 (1926). 
 105. See Brennan v. University of Kan., 451 F.2d 1287 (10th Cir. 1971). 
 106. 155 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 107. See id. at 70. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. at 71–72. 
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In Charley’s Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Hawaii, 
Inc.,110 the Ninth Circuit used the Eleventh Amendment to justify its 
holding that state agencies could be found immune from antitrust 
liability “regardless of whether these particular actions or their anti-
competitive effects were contemplated by the legislature.”111 The 
court justified treating state agencies differently than cities for anti-
trust purposes because “cities are treated differently from branches of 
the state governments for purposes of the [E]leventh [A]mend-
ment . . . but state agencies and departments are protected in some 
circumstances from suit in federal court by the [E]leventh [A]mend-
ment’s bar against ‘one of the United States.’”112 
3. State agencies should be treated differently than municipalities for 
antitrust liability purposes 
Based on what has actually been said (or not said) by the Su-
preme Court concerning antitrust immunity for actions taken by 
state agencies, it appears that there is still room for interpretation. 
There does not appear to be a definite statement one way or the 
other about whether state agencies should be held to the clear articu-
lation standard or given ipso facto immunity. When the state action 
antitrust immunity categories are compared with the same group of 
actors in Eleventh Amendment cases, it becomes evident that state 
agencies should be treated differently than municipalities and the 
clear articulation requirement should not be applied. 
B. Commentator Discussions Support the View That the Clear 
Articulation Requirement Should Not Be Applied to State Agencies 
In order to determine the reasonableness of the First Circuit’s 
holding in Neo Gen, the next step in the analysis is to examine what 
commentators have said about applying the clear articulation re-
quirement to state agencies. Even though the Supreme Court has 
not specifically addressed whether the clear articulation requirement 
should apply to state agencies, some scholars have been fairly vocal 
about the reasons the clear articulation requirement should or should 
 
 110. 810 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 111. Id. at 876. 
 112. Id. at 876 n.6 (citing Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 
440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979); Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 
(1984)). 
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not apply to state agencies. Some writers argue that the clear articu-
lation requirement is necessary to overcome the threat of industries 
taking control of the regulation process.113 Other authors have ar-
gued against this position, explaining either that industry capture is 
not a legitimate problem or that there is not a big enough difference 
between the susceptibility of state legislatures and state agencies to 
justify the more onerous requirement for agencies.114 
Because industry capture does not appear to be a legitimate 
threat to agency decision making, the threat of industry capture is 
not a justifiable reason for imposing the clear articulation require-
ment. The advantages that state agencies give to government deci-
sion making and their legitimacy as state actors justify placing state 
agencies within the same category as state legislatures and state su-
preme courts and granting ipso facto immunity. 
1.  Commentators in favor of the clear articulation requirement are 
worried about industry capture of state agency policies 
William H. Page, of the Mississippi College School of Law, is 
one of the strongest supporters of applying the clear articulation re-
quirement to state agency action. He justifies the different antitrust 
immunity requirements for state legislatures and state agencies by 
explaining that 
[l]egislation presumptively embodies the sovereign choice of the 
state and is therefore worthy of deference. The policies adopted by 
an administrative body, by contrast, do not necessarily reflect the 
same reconciliation of interests as in the Madisonian model, and 
must therefore fall if not specifically authorized by the enabling leg-
islation.115 
Page thus reasons that the extra clear articulation requirement is jus-
tified because state agencies are staffed by bureaucrats who are not 
politically responsible to the electorate like legislators are. 
Additionally, Page argues that the basis of the Parker Doctrine is 
that states can depart from the competitive model only when the 
 
 113. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 114. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 115. William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction 
and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1099, 
1126 (1981). 
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citizens elect to do so.116 Because state agencies are capable of de-
parting from the competitive model without authorization from a 
referendum by the people, the clear articulation requirement is seen 
as ensuring that the people are in favor of such a policy. The clear ar-
ticulation requirement, he argues, is a necessary burden upon state 
agencies because it “reinforces representative political processes by 
ensuring that the decision to displace antitrust is made only after 
competing interest groups have survived the traditional Madisonian 
gauntlet of legislative procedures.”117 
Because state agency decisions sidestep the “traditional Madison-
ian gauntlet,” Page argues that agency decision making lacks the bal-
ancing of interests that would occur in a democratic legislature.118 
This nature of agency decision making makes it “easier for ‘factional 
interests that have acquired a supportive public bureaucracy to rule 
without submitting their interests to the effective scrutiny and modi-
fication of other interests.’”119 Because regulated industries are the 
most interested and organized group, Page argues that they are able 
to wield disproportionate weight and “capture” agency policy mak-
ing.120 
Legislators are less likely to have their decisions captured by fac-
tional interests because they “have a far larger number of decision 
makers; this fact by itself makes them more costly to influence [than 
administrative agencies].”121 Because state agency policy is more 
likely to be captured, according to Page, the clear articulation re-
quirement is necessary to ensure that decisions that depart from the 
competitive model are authorized only when the people choose to 
do so through their elected state representatives. 
However, in developing his argument that the Parker Doctrine 
was based on political accountability, Page does not address the issue 
of why state supreme courts are given ipso facto immunity regardless 
of whether the justices are subject to election. If judges who are not 
popularly elected are not subjected to a clear articulation require-
 
 116. See id. at 1106. 
 117. William H. Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown 
in the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618, 619 (1987). 
 118. See Page, supra note 115, at 1112. 
 119. Id. (quoting James Q. Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, in PERSPECTIVES 
ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 16, 28 (Robert L. Rabin ed., 1979)). 
 120. See id. 
 121. Page, supra note 117, at 634. 
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ment, then it would seem unfair to argue that state agencies should 
have the clear articulation requirement imposed upon them merely 
because agency officers are not popularly elected. 
2.  The clear articulation requirement is unnecessary for state agencies 
 Various authors have argued that state agencies should not be 
subject to the clear articulation requirement for different reasons. 
Some argue that state legislators are just as subject to capture as state 
agencies and that capture is not enough of a legitimate threat to jus-
tify the added burden. Others explain that the clear articulation re-
quirement would lead to wasted resources and inefficiency. They 
agree, however, that the clear articulation requirement is unnecessary 
for state agencies. 
a. Legislators are just as subject to capture as state agencies. In an 
article responding to Page, one critic argues that legislators are actu-
ally even more subject to capture than are state agency officials. The 
author explains that “a straightforward way for an industry to cap-
ture the benefits of anticompetitive state policy is to pay state poli-
cymakers for the favor, as part of a great American tradition called 
campaign contributions. Yet contributing to state bureaucrats is typi-
cally a felony.”122 This critic also disputes Page’s theory that the 
greater number of decision makers in legislatures make agencies eas-
ier to capture. Since legislatures usually internally delegate a great 
degree of authority, “it is not clear that, on any given issue, commit-
tee members or informed and influential legislators in fact do out-
number the board members of a typical agency.”123 
Page’s answer to these arguments is that the number theory 
alone is not the only factor that makes legislators less subject to cap-
ture. Page explains that bicameralism and the executive veto also 
serve to establish controls on factions.124 However, historical exam-
ples raise serious questions about whether legislatures are really any 
more immune to capture than agencies. One author explains that 
there have been “several instances in recent years of relatively inde-
pendent and farsighted agency action blocked by a Congress acting 
 
 122. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism: Reply to Profes-
sors Page and Spitzer, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1331 (1988). 
 123. Id. at 1332. 
 124. See Page, supra note 117, at 631. 
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in the service of special interests.”125 Examples of these instances in-
clude congressional use of the budget to control Securities and Ex-
change Commission and Federal Petroleum Commission enforce-
ment activities in a way favorable to industries. The ability of the 
cigarette lobby to convince Congress to prevent the Federal Trade 
Commission from requiring proper disclosure of the hazards of ciga-
rette smoking is another example of a legislative body bending to in-
dustry pressure more than the agency involved.126 Another author 
argues that since the safeguards of public hearings and judicial review 
that apply to administrative agencies do not apply to Congress or its 
subcommittees the legislature should not be viewed as being less 
subject to capture than regulatory agencies.127 These arguments, 
taken together, suggest that there does not appear to be enough dif-
ference between legislatures’ and agencies’ susceptibility to capture 
to justify the extra burden of a clear articulation requirement for 
agency action before immunity can be applied. 
Agencies are not any more susceptible to capture by industry in-
terests than legislatures. In fact, history appears to suggest that in-
dustries have chosen to capture legislative behavior in order to influ-
ence agency decision making rather than working directly with the 
agencies. Campaign contributions and lobbying efforts appear to be 
more effective means of industry capture than risking felony indict-
ments for attempting to sway state bureaucrats. Therefore, the fear 
of possible industry capture of industry decision making does not 
justify subjecting agencies to the clear articulation requirement. 
b. Capture is not a real danger to agency decision making. Not 
only is there no real difference between agencies and legislatures 
when it comes to capture, a legitimate argument can be made that 
capture is not even a legitimate problem. Capture theory is “still 
popular with pseudosophisticates, but the more instructed . . . see it 
as grossly exaggerating the germ of truth which it does indeed em-
body.”128 This germ of truth indicates that the interests of regulated 
industries do play a significant role in the power complex of agency 
 
 125. See Abraham D. Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and 
Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1306 (1972). 
 126. See id. at 1306–07 & n.63 (1972) (citing WILLIAM L. CARY, POLITICS AND THE 
REGULATORY AGENCIES ch. 2 (1967)). 
 127. See Richard B. Stewart, Madison’s Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 351 (1990). 
 128. Louis L. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 
1187–88 (1973). 
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decision making but that capture theory focuses too much on the 
industries while excluding other components such as expertise, 
stability, and a rationalized exercise of power.129 
Other important components that tend to cancel out the capture 
theory include agency interaction with the governor and the legisla-
ture.130 Procedural requirements such as public hearings and judicial 
review also help to provide the political safeguards that Page argues 
are lacking.131 A logistical analysis of state agency decisions about 
utility rate structures revealed that regulatory resources, ideology, 
and legislative party control all had greater influences on state regula-
tion than any pressure by interest groups.132 Because industry capture 
of agency decisions does not appear to be a legitimate threat, it can-
not be used to justify the clear articulation requirement. 
c. Applying the clear articulation requirement to state agencies 
leads to wasted resources and inefficiency. The clear articulation re-
quirement is not only unjustified, it also appears to place an undue 
burden on state administration. Agencies perform a valuable function 
in today’s society in being able to focus their policymaking efforts in 
specialized areas where agency officials have developed expertise. 
One policymaking advantage that agencies hold over legislatures is 
that legislators lack expertise and must tend a broader field than any 
single person can master.133 Legislators are often incapable of setting 
out detailed specifications in their delegations of power because 
delegation requires “intensive and continuous investigation, deci-
sion, and revision of specialized and complex issues.”134 These tasks 
require resources that legislators are usually unable or unwilling to 
muster.135 
 
 
 
 129. See id. at 1188. 
 130. See GLENN ABNEY & THOMAS P. LAUTH, THE POLITICS OF STATE AND CITY 
ADMINISTRATION 100 (1986). 
 131. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1679–81 (1975). 
 132. See Paul Teske, Interests and Institutions in State Regulation, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
139, 139 (1991). 
 133. See Ira Sharkansky, State Administrators in the Political Process, in POLITICS IN THE 
AMERICAN STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 238, 251 (Herbert Jacob & Kenneth N. Vines 
eds., 2d ed. 1971). 
 134. Stewart, supra note 131, at 1695. 
 135. See id. 
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State reliance on agency decision making in this century has been 
“vastly common and commonly vast.”136 State governments need 
agencies in order to efficiently carry out regulating duties. Applying 
the clear articulation requirement is costly because it is likely to dis-
courage delegation, which permits greater governmental efficiency. 
The clear statement doctrine penalizes delegation because it “incurs 
costs by making the process of state government more difficult and 
time consuming.”137 If state governments are forced to be more spe-
cific in delegating power to agencies, then they will be forced to stop 
delegating such power and will develop rules and regulations with-
out the specific expertise agency officers are able to employ. As more 
time is devoted to detailed regulation previously taken care of by 
agencies, state governments will be unable, and sometimes unwilling, 
to take the time to deal with difficult issues. 
Imposing the clear articulation rule on state agencies will also 
lead to inefficiency because state agencies will have to spend more 
time seeking approval from state legislatures rather than making de-
cisions. Moreover, enforcing the clear articulation rule will lead to 
efficiency problems in the judicial branch. Enforcement of the clear 
articulation rule “will prompt state agents to waste resources obtain-
ing authorization, will imperil agents’ actions that lack such authori-
zation, . . . and will involve federal courts in state law issues.”138 Us-
ing the rule set out in Neo Gen would overcome these costs and 
inefficiencies and allow continued delegation to state agencies where 
state officers could put their expertise to use. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The First Circuit in Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England 
Newborn Screening Program139 correctly held that state agency action 
can be viewed as action taken by the state itself and is therefore enti-
tled to state action antitrust immunity without applying the same 
clear articulation requirement used for examining actions taken by 
municipalities. Applying the clear articulation requirement to state 
agencies would likely mean that state legislators would be forced to 
 
 136. Wiley, supra note 122, at 1331. 
 137. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 713, 733–34 (1986). 
 138. Id. at 738–39. 
 139. 187 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1999). 
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spend more time regulating specialized areas better suited to experts. 
The nebulous threat of industry capture of state agency decisions 
does not justify this damaging loss in efficiency. 
The Supreme Court has not “clearly articulated” what type of 
analysis should be applied to state agencies in order to grant state ac-
tion antitrust immunity. The First Circuit’s ruling in Neo Gen is im-
portant because it provides a legitimate framework to balance the 
competing interests of political responsibility against the efficiency of 
utilizing expertise for regulatory decision making. The actions of 
agencies that exercise statewide jurisdiction deserve antitrust immu-
nity without a search for a clear articulation from the state legisla-
ture. State agencies should be viewed as legitimate representatives of 
the state acting as sovereign because agencies are more similar to 
state legislative, executive, and judicial branches than municipalities 
or private actors. Because state agencies are not subject to a greater 
threat of industry capture than these governmental branches and be-
cause agencies promote greater governmental efficiency, they should 
not be held to the higher clear articulation standard. 
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